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Abstract 
Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) pose significant 
humanitarian problems to the civilians as well as to the 
governments in post conflict situations. People continue 
to be at risk even after the war due to the presence of 
ERW. The issue of ERW has in fact shifted the focus of the 
international community from the immediate impacts of 
the weapons to their long term effects. In response to this, 
states concluded a landmark agreement, Protocol V to the 
UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in 
2003 (CCW). This Protocol aims at providing a proper 
mechanism to deal with ERW threat. Meanwhile, with the 
beginning of the new century and the emergence of newly 
sophisticated weapons the debate over the ERW got 
shifted to one of the most menacing category of weapons 
called cluster munitions. Again, responding to the 
problem, the state parties adopted the Convention of 
Cluster Munitions 2003 which bans the use and 
development of these deadly weapons. Both these 
instruments suffer from certain inherent limitations. 
Despite these limitations they still serve as the last resort 
for the civilians as well as for the governments of the war 
torn communities in dealing with the catastrophic effects 
of ERW.  
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„Wars do not always end with the last gunshot or the signing of a 
ceasefire agreement.  The remnants of war are also a threat to 
civilians and military personnel alike and impede humanitarian 
assistance, peacekeeping, post conflict reconstruction and 
development‟.1 
Warfare is by its very nature very lethal and damaging. Weapons 
that are indiscriminate by their very nature or by the reason of their 
operation are verboten. Even when properly targeted, many 
explosive weapons fail to function as designed and become 
explosive remnants of war (ERW).2 Every modern conflict generally 
leaves behind large amounts of explosive remnants of war.3 These 
are the explosive munitions that have been fired, dropped or 
otherwise delivered during the fighting but have failed to explode 
as intended or have been abandoned by the warring parties on the 
battle field.4 This is a persistent problem5 and a grave threat6 that 
                                                          
1
 Kofi Annan, Integrate Removal, Destruction of Explosive War Remnants into 
Mine Action, (2006), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 2006/ 
sgsm10732.doc.htm (last visited Jun. 4, 2013) (each year large numbers of 
civilians are killed and injured by “explosive remnants of war”. These are the 
unexploded weapons such as artillery shells, mortars, grenades, bombs and 
rockets, left behind after an armed conflict); See also Explosive Remnants of War, 
ICRC, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/weapons/explosive-
remnants-war/index.jsp (last visited Aug. 09, 2013). 
2
 John Borrie, Explosive Remnants of War: A Global Survey (Landmine Action 
2003) (earlier they were treated as the synonym of unexploded ordnance. But the 
Protocol V introduced another category of ERW i.e. Abandoned Explosive 
Ordnance). 
3
 Gugu Dube, Getting Rid of the Explosive Remnants of War (Feb. 02, 2012), 
available at http://www.issafrica.org/iss_today.php?ID=1422 (today, many 
African states are affected by this problem. Angola, Chad, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Uganda, Western 
Sahara and Zambia are some of them). 
4
 Louis Maresca, A New Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War: The History 
and Negotiation of Protocol V to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, 86(856) Intl Rev Red Cross (2004), available at http://www.icrc.org/ 
eng/assets/files/other/irrc_856_maresca.pdf (last visited Jun. 2, 2013). 
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can kill or injure the civilians of affected areas who subsequently 
contaminate or tamper with them.7 Most often, their victims are the 
most vulnerable members of the society.8 These remnants may 
threaten the society for decades even when the actual war has 
ended a long time back.9 
                                                                                                                                    
5
 Canadian Red Cross, Explosive Remnants of War, available at 
http://www.redcross.ca/article.asp?id=28545&tid=006 (last visited Jun. 2, 2012) 
(in Laos around 27 million sub-munitions remained unexploded even though the 
war actually ended in 1975). 
6
 See Daniele Ressler, A Primer on Explosive Remnants of War, Journal of Mine 
Action, (Aug. 01, 2008), available at http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.1/ 
feature/ressler/ressler.htm (Landmine Action U.K. reported that in Kosovo 
between 1999 and 2001, while landmines caused about 13 percent of civilian 
deaths, unexploded cluster bomb sub-munitions proved a larger threat, 
contributing to almost 32 percent of deaths). 
7
 See Louis Maresca & Camilla Waszink, The Legacy Of Explosive Remnants of 
War, Magazine of International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 
available at  http://www.redcross.int/EN/mag/magazine2003_4/12-13.html (last 
visited Jul. 29, 2013) (in Laos, where the wars in Indochina during the 1950s, 
1960s and 1970s have left this country heavily affected by explosive remnants of 
war. It is estimated that between 9 and 27 million unexploded sub munitions 
remain, although hostilities ended in 1975. Some 11,000 people have been killed 
or injured, a large percentage being children). 
8
 See UNICEF Press Release, In Iraq, Unexploded Munitions Become Child’s 
Play, available at http://www.unicef.org/media/media_12056.html (last visited 
Aug. 24, 2013). 
9
 The Burden of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War Rests With the 
Civilian Population, Mine Action, available at http://www.fsd.ch/mine-action 
(last visited Nov. 29, 2012) (landmines and explosive remnants of war therefore 
create long-term damage to rural and low income farming communities as the 
amount of arable land is reduced. Therefore, the presence of landmines on 
agricultural land can cause malnutrition or even famines, leading to an increased 
need for food aid. Many individuals living in contaminated areas are forced to 
choose between staying and facing a deadly threat every day or abandoning their 
land and livelihood). 
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The problem of ERW has grown steadily10 in the past few decades 
with the proliferation of increasingly sophisticated weapons and is 
being reported in around 90 countries and disputed territories till 
now.11 
Explosive remnants of war consisting of abandoned explosive 
ordnance and unexploded ordnance as a result of armed conflicts 
pose significant threats to the survival and development of civilian 
populations.12 Poland, which was severely affected by ERW after 
the Second World War (1939-1945) as late as 1989 to 2000, military 
engineers cleared 3,428,290 explosive devices, of which only 12,620 
were mines.13 
Despite a growing awareness about the catastrophic effects of 
these, states continue to use weapons that are malfunctioning, 
hence produce ERW and as a consequence cause casualties among 
civilians. Controlling ERW is thus a key element in establishing and 
sustaining peace in post conflict situations, which in turn is a 
prerequisite for sustainable economic development.14  
                                                          
10
 Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, United States Department of States, To 
Walk the Earth in Safety, The United States’ Commitment to Humanitarian Mine 
Action and Conventional Weapons Destruction (8
th
 ed., 2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/125873.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 
2012) (this document gives a very clear picture of the countries being affected by 
Explosive Remnants of War). 
11
 R. Moyes, Explosive Remnants of War and Mines Other than Anti-personnel 
Mines: Global Survey 2003–2004, Landmine Action (2005). 
12
 See Directorate of Political Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign 
Affairs, Protecting the Civilian Population from Mines and Explosive Remnants 
of War (this project was aimed at removing the remnants of war materials in 
Libya. The freedom of movement of the population, direct and preventive 
protection of the population and the social development of the country are all 
closely linked to de-mining). 
13
 See Paul Ellis, Explosive Remnants of War: The Impact of Current 
Negotiations, 7(1) J ERW & Mine Action (2003), available at 
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/7.1/focus/ellis/ellis.htm (last visited Jun. 4, 2013) 
(also, in the year 2006, around 1,189 mine and 76,512 ERW were cleared). 
14
 Kathleen M Jennings & Christian H. Ruge, Killing Many Birds with Few 
Stones: Integrating ERW and SALW Actions with Peace-Building Efforts, United 
Explosive Remnants of War              Christ University Law Journal, 2, 2(2013) 
5 
 
Explosive Remnants of War 
Protocol V15 of Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 2003 
(CCW) provides a legal definition for explosive remnants of war 
(ERW). It defines ERW as unexploded ordnance (UXO)16 and 
abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO).17 Protocol V‟s definition of 
ERW provides two important modifications to the popular 
understanding of ERW-as-UXO. The first one is the inclusion of 
„abandoned explosive ordnance‟ which marks a departure from the 
traditional meaning of ERW as UXO and it now includes weapons 
that were not used at all.18 The second modification is that this new 
legal definition specifically excludes the remnants that would not 
                                                                                                                                    
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (2004), available at 
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/EU_background_papers/EU_BGP_19.pdf (last visited 
Jun. 26, 2013). 
15
 (in a message delivered in Geneva by Jarmo Sareva, the director of the 
Conference on Disarmament Secretariat and Conference Support Branch, the 
secretary-general noted that the Protocol has a critical role to play in eliminating 
explosive remnants of war); See Global Pact on Explosive Remnants of War 
Deserves Universal Support, People’s Daily Online, Nov. 23, 2010, available at 
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90856/7207704.html. 
16
 See Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) Definitions, Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining, available at 
http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/publications/UXO_Definitions_Paper.pdf 
(last visited Jul. 30, 2013) (explosive ordnance that has been primed, fuzed, 
armed or otherwise prepared for use or used.  It may have been fired, dropped, 
launched or projected yet remains unexploded either through malfunction or 
design or for any other reason). 
17
 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, (Nov. 12, 2006) (2006) 45 I.L.M. 
1348, art. 2(4). 
18
 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, (Nov. 12, 2006) (2006) 45 I.L.M. 
1348, art. 2(3) (Protocol V defines AXO as “explosive ordnance that has not been 
used during an armed conflict, that has been left behind or dumped by a party to 
an armed conflict, and which is no longer under control of the party that left it 
behind or dumped it”). 
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fall under the category of ERW19 due to separate obligation under 
CCW Amended Protocol II20 and thus making the classification 
much easier. But here exists a potentially problematic gap between 
an understanding of ERW with regard to legal obligations of state 
parties and an understanding of effective clearance operations. This 
technical definition may produce difficulties for the clearance team 
regarding what are they supposed to clear on the ground.21 
In order to resolve this conflict, the definition proposed by Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) can be 
taken into account.22 The GICHD divided the ERW threat into four 
broad areas that are useful as a framework to comprehend better 
what ordnance might pragmatically be included in ERW risk: 
1. Mine23 and UXO contamination of the ground. 
2. Abandoned armored fighting vehicles. 
3. Small arms and light weapons (SALW),24 including limited 
ammunition and explosives in the possession of civilians and non 
state actors. 
                                                          
19
 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, (Nov. 12, 2006) (2006) 45 I.L.M. 
1348, art. 2(1) (Mines, booby traps and manually emplaced munitions/other 
devices etc. are excluded from Protocol V). 
20
 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and 
Other Devices as amended on 3 May 1996 (Protocol II to the 1980 CCW 
Convention as amended on 3 May 1996), International Humanitarian Law - 
Treaties & Documents, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/575?OpenDocument (last visited Jul. 28, 2013). 
21
 Ressler, supra note 6. 
22
 Adrian Wilkinson, Explosive Remnants of War: A Threat Analysis, Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (2002). 
23
 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (adopted 18 September 1997, 
entered into force 1 March 1999), 36 I.L.M. 1507, art. 2(2) (it defines mine as a 
munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area 
and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle. 
And therefore, though not legally, but functionally they act as ERW). 
24
 Paddy Blagden & Adrian Wilkinson, Explosive Remnants of War: A “Quick 
Look” Threat Analysis, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
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4. Abandoned or damaged or disrupted stockpiles of ammunition 
and explosives.25 
Therefore, this definition of ERW is helpful in avoiding the clash 
between the practical and legal understanding of explosive 
remnants of war. 
Impact of Explosive Remnants of War on Humanity 
As the Preamble of Protocol V of CCW, 2003 recognizes, the 
presence of ERW creates crippling humanitarian effects in war torn 
countries. The most evident of them is the casualties that they 
cause. On an average ERW kill or injure more people than 
landmines and put a heavy toll on medical infrastructure.26 They 
are unpredictable and can be exploded at any time under a variety 
of stimuli. Known as killing fields27 in Cambodia and devil’s 
gardens28 in Afghanistan, areas contaminated with explosive 
remnants of war are known for their impartiality when claiming 
victims, the majority of whom are children.29 In Laos, ERW are 
                                                                                                                                    
(2001), available at 
http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/publications/Threat_Analysis_Paper.pdf (last 
visited Jun. 6, 2013) (it defines SALW as all lethal conventional munitions that 
can be carried by an individual combatant or a light vehicle, that also do not 
require a substantial logistic and maintenance capability). 
25
 Adrian Wilkinson & Bob Scott, Explosive Remnants of War: Undesired 
Explosive Events in Ammunition Storage Areas, Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (2002). 
26
 Laurence Desvignes, Stuart Maslen & Johan Sohlberg, Protecting Civilians 
from Explosive Remnants of War: A Guide to Provide Warnings under CCW 
Protocol V, Landmine Action (2004). 
27
 Clear Path International, Cambodia Program, available at 
http://cpi.org/?project=cambodia (last visited Jun. 30, 2013). 
28
 U.S. Fed News Service, Afghanistan's "Devil's Garden" Bloom, available at 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1116589191.html (last visited Jun. 30, 2013). 
29
 See Blake Williamson, The Impact of ERW on Children, 15(3) J ERW & Mine 
Action (2011), available at 
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/15.3/notes/williamson/williamson.htm (last visited 
Jun. 5, 2012); See also Impact of Mines/ERW on Children, Land Mine and Cluster 
Munition Fact Sheet, available at 
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believed to have claimed 13,000 victims between 1973 and 2006.30 
Worldwide, landmines and unexploded ordnance kill and maim 
approximately 20,000 people annually, one third of them being 
children.31 The explosive force of these munitions and their 
fragments32 tend to be directed towards the abdomen, torso and 
head regions of victims‟ bodies.33  ERW when present in large 
quantities can cause massive trauma and kill or injure people in a 
wide radius.34 Usually, ERW have a metal casing; fragments are 
dispersed at high speed causing severe injuries. Injuries sustained 
include multiple traumatic amputations of limbs, burns, punctures 
by shrapnel, ruptured eardrums and blindness.35 Their surgery 
                                                                                                                                    
http://www.unicef.org/protection/Monitor_Fact_Sheet_Children_November_2010
.pdf (last visited Jul. 1, 2013) (a total of 3,956 new casualties from mines, 
explosive remnants of war (ERW), and victim activated improvised explosive 
devices (IEDs) were recorded in 64 countries and other areas in 2009). 
30
 Kateland Shane, Lao PDR: Country Profile, 10(2) J ERW & Mine Action 
(2006), available at http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.2/profiles/laos/laos.htm (last 
visited Jun. 7, 2013) (Laos is badly affected by this ERW problem. Since 1964, 
more than 50,000 ERW casualties have been reported in the country). 
31
 Jonmahmad Rajabov, Explosive Remnants of War and Their Consequences, 
10(2) J ERW & Mine Action (2006), available at 
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.2/focus/rajabov/rajabov.htm (last visited Jun. 6, 
2013). 
32
 See Weapons of Mass Destruction, available at 
http://www.phtls.fr/admin/ed7pdf/19.pdf (last visited Jun. 30, 2013) (fragment 
(fragmentation) injury, or secondary injury, is the most common category of 
injury in terrorist bombings and low-order explosions. These projectiles may be 
components of the bomb itself, as from military weapons designed to fragment, or 
from improvised bombs augmented with nails, screws, and bolts). 
33
 Robin Coupland & Hans Samnegaard, Effect of Type and Transfer of 
Conventional Weapons on Civilian Injuries: Retrospective Analysis of 
Prospective Data from Red Cross Hospitals, 319 British Medical J 410 (1999). 
34
 John Borrie, Explosive Remnants of War: A Global Survey, Landmine Action 
(2003). 
35
 Henry Dowlen, Cluster Munitions: Should They be Banned?, (2008) 12(1) J 
ERW & Mine Action, available at 
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/12.1/sp/dowlen/dowlen.htm (last visited Jun. 1, 
2013). 
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involves the staged surgical management of the wounded, often at 
different echelons of care and provided by different surgeons 
which is again very difficult to find in post conflict situations.36 
Even with the passage of time, survivors often have low levels of 
overall physical health37 and experience on going pain as a result of 
their injuries.38 Most survivors show symptoms of chronic post 
traumatic stress disorder, and survivors often have reduced 
emotional well being due to depression, anxiety, fear, anger, 
dependence on others, and isolation.39 The victims often endure 
psychological trauma in addition to physical injury.40 
ERW also hampers efforts of the affected communities to achieve 
sustainable development.41 Their presence prevents the usage and 
                                                          
36
 Christos Giannou & Marco Baldan, War surgery: Working with Limited 
Resources in Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Violence, 1 ICRC (2009). 
37
 See ICRC, Health Care in Danger, A Sixteenth Country Study, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/reports/4073-002-16-country-study.pdf (last 
visited Jul. 30, 2013) (a sound, intact health-care infrastructure and the safety of 
health-care personnel are prerequisites for the delivery of health care. When 
people take up arms for whatever reason, health care is disrupted in a variety of 
ways: fighting prevents personnel from reaching their place of work; health-care 
facilities and medical vehicles are inadvertently damaged; soldiers or police 
forcibly enter health-care facilities looking for enemies or “criminals;” and 
sometimes gaining control of a hospital is sometimes an objective of fighters. In 
the most serious cases, health-care facilities are directly targeted, the wounded 
and the sick are attacked and personnel are threatened, kidnapped, injured or 
killed). 
38
 See Blackeney et al., Long Term Physiological Adjustment Following Burn 
Injury, 9(6) J Burn Care & Rehabilitation 661 (1988). 
39
 Reykhan Muminova, Art Therapy and Sport Activities Enhance Psychosocial 
Rehabilitation, 15(2) J ERW & Mine Action (2011), available at 
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/15.2/focus/muminova/muminova.htm (last visited 
Jun. 7, 2013). 
40
 Nida Corry, Thomas Pruzinsky & Nichola Rumsey, Quality of Life and 
Psychosocial Adjustment to Burn Injury: Social Functioning, Body Image, and 
Health Policy Perspectives, 21(6) Intl Rev Psychiatry 539 (2009). 
41
 See ICRC, Caring for Landmine Victims, available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/caring-landmine-victims-0863.pdf (last 
visited Jul. 30, 2013) (most mine victims live in the world’s poorest countries, 
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application of community infrastructure and resources for 
reconstruction. Also, they deny access to land42 and hinder free 
movement and in poor community people have no choice but to 
use the contaminated land.43 Further the agricultural capacity will 
diminish44 because access to land is mired by the presence of UXOs. 
Vast tracts of valuable land continue to be plagued by landmine 
and ERW contamination.45 According to a survey conducted in 
Laos in 1997, around 87,213 square kilometers of land (out of a 
country wide total of 236,800 square kilometers) are considered as 
being at risk from UXO contamination and thus of no use to the 
                                                                                                                                    
many of which are recovering from years or decades of war. Every new casualty 
adds an increasing burden on health structures already strained beyond capacity 
by the need to support hundreds of thousands of landmine survivors injured in the 
1980s and 1990s). 
42
 See Jon Unruh et al., Volatile Landscapes: the Impact of Explosives Remnants 
of War on Land Rights in Conflict Affected Countries, Journal of Peace, Conflict 
& Development, available at 
http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk/dl/2%20Iss%2018%20Art%204%20Final.
pdf (last visited Jul. 30, 2013) (land rights problems during and after war are 
multifaceted, often fluid, pervasive, usually contentious and confrontational, and 
can be long lasting. Land and property issues are often a central feature of civil 
wars, either as a direct or contributing cause, a pre-existing tension, or as a series 
of problems that emerge during conflicts). 
43
 Peter Herby & Anna Nuiten, Explosive Remnants of War: Protecting Civilians 
Through an Additional Protocol to the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, Intl Rev Red Cross (2001), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jqyv.htm (last visited May 
12, 2013). 
44
 Project profile for Agriculture in Mine-Affected Areas, Canadian International 
Development Agency, available at 
http://www.acdicida.gc.ca/CIDAWEB/cpo.nsf/vWebProjByPartnerEn/512B4170
7BCC2D4B852571400058DBAF (last visited Jul. 30, 2013). 
45
 Sayed Aqa, Mine Action: Success and Challenges, 9(1) J ERW & Mine Action 
(2005), available at http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/9.1/Focus/aqa/aqa.htm (last 
visited May 21, 2013) (for instance, in a survey conducted in Afghanistan in the 
year 2005, it was found that ERW contaminated an area of 270km² thereby 
affecting 657 communities for a total of 715.6km²). 
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civilians.46 In addition to this, due to their metallic value, people, 
especially in poor communities undertake the risk of locating and 
extracting these explosives.47 The simple answer to why people 
deliberately handle them is because they have no other means of 
survival. The World Bank also pointed out these adverse effects of 
ERW on the economy of war torn communities in 2004.48 Fear of 
ERW makes it difficult for the people to overcome physiological 
trauma of war.49,50 They also present obstacles in reestablishing 
peace by affecting peacekeeping efforts of the government.51 
                                                          
46
 Bounpheng Sisavath, UXO Lao’s Fight against Unexploded Ordnance, 9(2) J 
ERW & Mine Action (2006), available at 
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/9.2/focus/sisavath/sisavath.htm (last visited May 20, 
2013). 
47
 Allan R Vosburgh, The War Goes On, 9(2) J ERW & Mine Action (2006), 
available at http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/9.2/focus/vosburgh/vosburgh.htm (last 
visited Jun. 25, 2013). 
48
 Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit, The World Bank, Landmine 
Contamination: A Development Imperative, Social Development Note 20(Oct. 




 Patricia Blakeney & Daniel Creson, Psychological and Physical Trauma: 
Treating the Whole Person, 6(3) J ERW & Mine Action (2002), available at 
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/6.3/focus/blakeneyCreson/blakeneyCreson.htm (last 
visited Jun. 6, 2013). 
50
 See Kerry Smith, Devastating Effect: Explosive Weapons and Children, Save 
the Children U.K., available at 
http://www.unicef.org/protection/Devastating_Impact_low_res.pdf (last visited 
Jun. 30, 2013) (in Northern Ireland, over one-third of those seeking trauma 
counseling after the Omagh bomb of August 1998 were children. Trauma at a 
critical time in their psychological development can cause children to drop out of 
education and can lead to mental illness, substance abuse and social problems). 
51
 See Roman Hunger, Explosive Remnants of War: The Problem, 2(4) Strategic 
Insights (Apr. 2003) (recent studies of contemporary conflicts have shown that 
the threat posed by Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) to the civil population as 
well as to peace keeping forces is of great humanitarian concern. Because of a 
lack of specific legal regulations on the issue of ERW, a large number of 
innocents have been killed or injured by ERW after conflicts have ended). 
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The illicit trade of these abandoned explosives links them with 
more serious issues of terrorism.52 The natural environment of the 
region also gets severely affected.53 All in all, ERW affect all stages 
of conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution and 
post conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction.54 
Protocol V to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons 2003 
The use of so called 'cluster bombs' in the Kosovo Campaign in 
1999 generated much discussion over the problems of clearance of 
unexploded ordnance (UXO).55 The ICRC subsequently held a 
meeting in Nyon (Switzerland) on 18th and 19th September 2000 at 
which it drew attention to the problem caused by ERW.56 This 
initiative signaled the beginning of the discussions in the CCW 
2003 framework on the issue of ERW.  
In December 2001, the second review conference of parties to the 
CCW 2003 established a group of governmental experts to discuss 
                                                          
52
 Jonathan Stevenson, The Flow of Small Arms and Explosives to Terrorist 
Groups: EU Challenges and Remedies, United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research (2005), available at 
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/EU_background_papers/EU_BGP_15.pdf (last visited 
May 21, 2013). 
53
 Faiz Paktian, Mine Action and the Environment, 11(2) J ERW & Mine Action 
(2008), available at http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/11.2/feature/paktian/paktian.htm, 
(last visited Jun. 5, 2013). 
54
 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, European Action on Small 
Arms and Light Weapons and Explosive Remnants of War: Final Report (2006). 
55
 See BBC News, Kosovo Mine Expert Criticizes NATO, (May 23, 2000), 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/761092.stm (last visited Jul. 28, 
2013); See also Cluster Munitions in Kosovo Analysis of Use, Contamination and 
Casualties, Land Mine Action, available at  
http://www.landmineaction.org/resources/Cluster%20Munitions%20in%20Kosov
o.pdf (last visited Jun. 30, 2013). 
56
 See ICRC Report of the Expert Meeting on Explosive Remnants of War in Nyon 
(Switzerland, 2000); See also ICRC Report Cluster Bombs and Landmines in 
Kosovo (Geneva, 2001). 
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the issue of ERW.57 It was quite obvious that the sole issue for them 
was going to be the long term effects of war weapons and not 
specific weapons causing it. In the same meeting, a mandate in 
respect of ERW was agreed.58 The first formal round of negotiations 
for an instrument on ERW took place from 10to 12 March 2003.59 
Finally Protocol V of CCW 2003 was adopted on 28 November 
2003. It is the first multilateral agreement to address the various 
humanitarian problems created by a range of unexploded and 
abandoned ordnance in a post conflict situation. The third review 
conference was held from 7-17 November 2006 and it came into 
force on 12 November 2006.60 The relevant provisions of the 
Protocol are discussed below. 
Clearance, Removal and Destruction of Explosive Remnants 
of War 
Clearance with respect to battle area is defined as the systematic 
and controlled clearance of hazardous areas where the hazards are 
known not to include mines.61 
                                                          
57
 Second Review Conference of the State Parties on Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons, Group of Governmental Experts on Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons, (21 December 2001) UN Doc CCW/CONF.II/2. 
58
 Sean Murphy, Adoption of Fifth CCW Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, 
98(2) AJIL 357(2004). 
59
 Rosy Cave, Disarmament as Humanitarian Action? Comparing Negotiations 
on Anti-Personnel Mines and Explosive Remnants of War, available at 
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2482.pdf (last visited Jun. 30, 2013). 
60
 Third Review Conference  of The High Contracting Parties to the Convention 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 
Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects, available at 
http://www.onug.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/55D7590AC626D471C12
5729E006042A1/$file/CCW+CONF.III+11+PART+I+E.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 
2013).  
61
 United Nations Mine Action Service, International Mine Action Standards, 
09.11: Battle Area Clearance, (Sept., 2007) ¶ 3, available at 
http://www.mineactionstandards.org/fileadmin/user_upload/MAS/documents/ima
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Article 3 of the Protocol V of CCW 2003 deals with the „clearance, 
removal and destruction‟ of ERW. It lays down that: 
Each High Contracting Party and party to an armed conflict 
shall bear their responsibilities set out in this Article with 
respect to all explosive remnants of war in the territory 
under its control. In cases where a use of explosive 
ordnance which has become explosive remnants of war, 
does not exercise control of the territory, the user shall, after 
the cessation of active hostilities, provide where feasible, 
inter alia technical, financial, material or human resources 
assistance, bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third 
party, including inter alia through the United Nations 
system or other relevant organizations, to facilitate the 
marking and clearance, removal or destruction of such 
explosive remnants of war. 
The clearance and disposal are urgently required as soon as the 
conflict ends.62 The first obligation which the Protocol V of CCW 
2003 casts on every party is to clear the remnants in their own 
territory. Apart from this, it casts an additional responsibility on 
the users of the explosive ordnance to provide assistance,63 
wherever feasible, to carry out clearance work outside their 
territory.64 And all these must be carried out „after the cessation of 
                                                                                                                                    
s-internationalstandards/english/series-09/IMAS-09-11-Ed1-Am1.pdf (last visited 




 See Explosive remnants of war and small arms: a new challenge for Libya, 
Handicap International, available at http://www.handicap-
international.us/fileadmin/files/documents/0704_SitRep_Libya.pdf (last visited 
Jul. 30, 2013) (to clear the land of Libya from the dangers of ERW a telephone 
hotline was set up in Misrata, allowing people to call and trigger the intervention 
of an expert. This expert moves to identify the explosive, establish a security 
perimeter, and transmit the information to the technical teams that will conduct 
the cleanup. Between October 2011 and April 2012, more than 300 suspected 
hazardous locations (homes, farms, gardens) have been identified). 
64
 See Draft Proposal for an Instrument on Explosive Remnants of War, Group of 
Governmental Experts on Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (May 
2003), UN Doc CCW/GGE/V/WG.1/WP.1/Rev.1 (this additional non-binding 
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hostilities‟ and „as soon as feasible‟. It includes both surface and sub 
surface clearance.65 In this regard, the parties are required to take 
into account the international standards.66 These measures include 
threat survey, assessment of needs, marking and resource 
mobilization to successfully carry out clearance operations. Priority 
setting of the affected area is also required.67 All these operations 
must be carried out by the qualified operators.68 Measures to 
facilitate the rapid and safe clearance of ERW are essential in 
addressing the problem.    
Warnings and Risk Education Relating to Explosive 
Remnants of War 
Under Article 5 of the Protocol V of CCW 2003, parties are required 
to take all feasible precautions to protect the post conflict 
community from the effects of ERW. This obligation is much 
narrower in operation as it is applicable only to the party in control 
of the contaminated territory. Also, it only talks about all feasible 
precautions69 and not all necessary precautions. The sole objective 
of providing warnings is to reach as many people as soon as 
possible with advice on threat and correct behavior to be adopted 
                                                                                                                                    
responsibility is the result of the opposition of US to the draft which contained a 
binding responsibility on the users to cooperate in the clearance work). 
65
 Supra note 61, ¶ 5.  
66
 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, (Nov. 12, 2006) (2006) 45 I.L.M. 
1348, art. 2(4). 
67
 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, (Nov. 12, 2006) (2006) 45 I.L.M. 
1348, art. 3(3). 
68
 See Electronic Mine Action Network, available at 
http://www.mineaction.org/country.asp?c=6 (last visited Jun. 30, 2013); See also 
Minefield and UXO clearance - Guinea Bissau, available at 
http://www.landmineaction.org/activities/activity.asp?PLID=1025 (last visited 
Jun. 30, 2013). 
69
 Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, (Nov. 12, 2006) (2006) 45 I.L.M. 
1348, art. 5 (feasible precautions are those precautions which are practicable or 
practicably possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the time, 
including humanitarian and military considerations). 
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after the war.70 The present structure of the said Article as well as 
its annexure are largely based on the report submitted by the 
GICHD during the negotiation process in order to address the main 
issues concerning warnings and risk education.71,72 The  annexure 
of the article and the report inter alia includes the following: 
a) It considers information collection as the basic necessity of Mine 
Risk Education (MRE)73 and this information may include threat 
analysis, country analysis and population analysis. 
b) It provides for the mechanism of using such information to plan 
MRE strategy. 
c) It also emphasizes on the role of the community in reducing risk 
and clarifies the position about who should provide such warnings. 
d) Finally, it outlines what MRE should provide. 
Moreover, the Annexure of the said Protocol provides for the 
adoption of proper procedure for marking, fencing, monitoring and 
utilization of warning signs near the contaminated region while 
taking into account the prevailing national and international 
standards and „at the earliest opportunity‟. 
Dissemination of Information about Explosive Remnants of 
War 
During the negotiation process of Protocol V of CCW 2003, United 
States submitted a discussion paper titled „Information Sharing as a 
                                                          
70
 Desvignes, Maslen & Sohlberg, supra note 26. 
71
 Martin Dahinden, Explosive Remnants of War: Warnings and Risk Education, 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (2003). 
72
 See Libya: Educating children about the explosive remnants of war, available 
at http://www.maginternational.org/news/libya-educating-children-about-the-
explosive-remnants-of-war/#.ULeLBOSTySo (last visited Jul. 29, 2013). 
73
 E-Mine, Mine Risk Education  (Jun. 2010), available at 
http://www.mineaction.org/overview.asp?o=17 (last visited May 22, 2013) (it 
refers MRE to include educational activities aimed at reducing the risk of injury 
from mines and unexploded ordnance by raising awareness and promoting 
behavioral change through public-information campaigns, education and training, 
and liaison with communities).  
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Tool to Protect Civilians from the effects of ERW‟.74 In this they 
identified various humanitarian information requirements essential 
for the clearance team like location, number, characters and method 
of destroying of munitions used. It also provided various 
considerations relating to such information sharing.75 Another 
paper in this regard was submitted by Landmine Action 
identifying the necessity of information sharing.76 Based on these 
papers and negotiations, Article 4 was engendered in the said 
Protocol. It states that- 
“High Contracting Parties and parties to an armed conflict shall 
to the maximum extent possible and as far as practicable record 
and retain information on the use of explosive ordnance or 
abandonment of explosive ordnance, to facilitate the rapid 
marking and clearance, removal or destruction of explosive 
remnants of war, risk education and the provision of relevant 
information to the party in control of the territory and to civilian 
population in the territory.” 
Further Article 4(2) of the said Protocol states that „make available 
such information to the party or parties in control of the affected 
area‟. Therefore both high contracting parties and parties to the 
                                                          
74
 U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, Information Sharing as a Tool to Protect Civilians from the Effects of 
UXO/ERW, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE/I/WP.8 (May 2002). 
75
 See Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) Information Requirement, Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, available at 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots783=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24 
a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=26677  (last visited Jun. 30, 2012) (the information 
required to assist clearance and risk education operations is generally available to 
most military forces. The issue is ensuring that accurate information is released in 
a timely manner and in a useable format. Failure to release the information by the 
military means that humanitarian organizations have no alternative but to try to 
find the answers themselves, as the information is essential to the safety and 
effectiveness of their work). 
76
 U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, Information Needs From a Field Perspective, U.N. Doc. 
CCW/GGE/II/WP.11 (Jul. 2002). 
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conflict must retain and record the information on the use or 
abandonment of weapons „as far as practicable‟. Further, under 
Article 4(2), such information must be shared without delay and 
„after the cessation of hostilities‟, with the party in control of the 
affected region bilaterally or with the help of mutually agreed third 
party.  
Assistance to Victims of Explosive Remnants of War77 
Article 7 and 8 of the Protocol V of CCW 2003 are the two 
provisions providing for the measures of assistance and 
cooperation among the victims.  
Article 7(1) provides that “Each High Contracting Party has the 
right to seek and receive assistance, where appropriate, from other 
High Contracting Parties, from states non party and relevant 
international organizations and institutions in dealing with the 
problems posed by existing explosive remnants of war.” 
Further, Article 7(2) provides that each High Contracting Party in a 
position to do so shall provide assistance in dealing with the 
problems posed by existing explosive remnants of war, as 
necessary and feasible. 
The only difference between the two is while Article 7 covers the 
problem caused by ERW already existing at the time the state 
become party to the Protocol, Article 8 applies only to those ERW 
cases that arise after the entry of party to the Protocol. 
                                                          
77
 See Explosive Remnants of War- Challenges for Victim Assistance, Berlin 
Conference Documentation, available at http://www.genevacall.org/resources/gc-
articles/f-gc-articles/2001-2010/2009-4nov-hi.pdf (last visited Jul. 29, 2013) 
(unlike the Convention on Cluster Munitions of December 2008, the 
Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention does not define the term “victim”. It was not 
until the first revision of this treaty that a broader understanding of victims was 
decided on and then stipulated in the Nairobi Final Report and the Nairobi Action 
Plan (Final Report 2004, Section IV). According to this outlook, victims are not 
only persons killed or injured in an accident with an antipersonnel mine but also 
their families and their communities). 
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Article 7 provides the High Contracting parties facing the ERW 
problem with the right to seek assistance from other states or 
organizations. Also, it casts a parallel obligation on the parties to 
provide assistance to other states dealing with such problem. Again 
this obligation is also subject to the qualifications such as „when 
necessary‟ and „where feasible‟. 
Article 8 enumerates various requirements in involving all high 
contracting parties in efforts to tackle the problem. Such programs 
may include or take care of:78 
1. Data collection and information management 
2. Medical needs of survivor 
3. Framework for ensuring equality of opportunity to the disabled 
persons 
4. Strategies for funding 
5. Psychological support of victims.79 
The major challenges faced while implementing these programs are 
access to care, capacity and sustainability, progress monitoring and 
prioritization. 
Generic Preventive Measures to Minimize the Occurrence 
of Explosive Remnants of War 
The Preamble of the Protocol V of CCW 2003 itself lays emphasis 
on adopting generic preventive measures in order to minimize the 
occurrence of ERW.  Poor manufacturing, improper storage, 
improper handling, incorrect launch profiles, poor strike angles, 
environment and insufficient training are basically the reasons for 
                                                          
78
 Stephan Husy, Mine Action and the Implementation of CCW Protocol V on 
Explosive Remnants of War, Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (2008). 
79
 Katleen Maes, Providing Appropriate Assistance to the Victims of Explosive 
Remnants of War, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (2004), 
available at http://www.unidir.org/pdf/EU_background_papers/EU_BGP_07.pdf 
(last visited Jun. 1, 2013). 
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their occurrence.80 This has further been dealt under Article 9 of the 
said Protocol which „encourages parties to take generic preventive 
measures‟. This means that this provision is not mandatory but 
voluntary in nature.  
Some of the measures are provided in the Technical Annex to the 
Article which contains the best practices which would help in 
reducing the volume of UXOs if properly followed.  
The measures outlined in the Annex are:81 
1. Munition manufacturing management to make sure that the 
weapons may not become ERW. 
2. Munition management to ensure their long term reliability. 
3. Training of all personnel involved in handling and use of 
weapons. 
4. Proper transfer of weapons after ensuring that receiving state has 
the adequate facilities for their use. 
5. Future production and improvement of the quality of weapons. 
All these measures would simplify any post conflict effort of the 
government. 
Limitations of Protocol V of Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons 2003 
Sometimes, the slowness of the Convention is criticized as even 
after 6 years of its ratification, it has only been signed by 78 states.82 
Fourth Review Conference of CCW also reiterated its goal of 
                                                          
80
 U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, U.N. Doc.CCW/GGE/I/WP.5 (May 2002) (the types of munitions 
which become explosive remnants of war and the factors which contribute to the 
occurrence of explosive remnants of war are explained here). 
81
 Id. (the measures provided in the annex were incorporated on the 
recommendations of European Union). 
82
 Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War to the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons, U.N. Treaty Collection, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-
2-d&chapter=26&lang=en (last visited Jun. 2, 2013). 
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universalisation of the Convention.83 Also, the Protocol is a legally 
binding text, but many of its qualifiers leave ample room for 
avoiding obligations. For instance, the states are not bound to deal 
with regions currently affected by ERW and it solely applies to 
future conflicts, although it does allow affected state parties to ask 
for voluntary cooperation and assistance for existing problems. It 
can be argued that such an instrument should either be fully 
binding or merely a political statement but not a mixture of both.84 
But despite all these limitations this Protocol represents 
advancement in international humanitarian law for ensuring the 
safety of post conflict societies.  
Cluster Munition 
By a process of elimination, the effort to address ERW has quickly 
come to focus primarily on one subgroup with the most serious 
impact on humanity.85 A cluster munition is defined as a 
conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release 
explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and 
includes those explosive submunitions.86 A submunition is an 
individual item of explosive ordnance contained within the 
dispenser or „parent munition‟ and which is ejected, expelled, or 
dispersed at some point after the cluster munition is fired, 
launched, expelled, or dropped.87 These bomblets are versatile in 
nature and each bomblet essentially acts similar to a powerful hand 
                                                          
83
 Group of Governmental Experts on Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, Final Document of the Fourth Review Conference of the High 
Contracting Parties to the Convention, U.N. Doc. CCW/CONF.IV/L.1/Rev.1 
(Nov. 2011). 
84
 Chris C Sanders, Contending with Explosive Remnants of War, 34(7) Arms 
Control Today (2004), available at 
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_09/Sanders (last visited Jun. 3, 2013). 
85
 Robin Collins, Tied Campaigns: Cluster Munitions, Explosive Remnants of 
War and Anti-personnel Landmines, 10(1) J ERW & Mine Action (2006), 
available athttp://maic.jmu.edu/journal/10.1/feature/collins/collins.htm, (last 
visited Jun. 9, 2013). 
86
 Convention on Cluster Munitions, 48 I.L.M. 357 (Aug., 2010). 
87
 Eric Filipinno, Guide to Cluster Munitions, 2 Geneva International Centre for 
Humanitarian Demining (2009). 
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grenade.88 At least 75 countries worldwide have stockpiled cluster 
munitions.89 It was found that up to 30,000 cluster munitions were 
left as UXO following the war in 1999.90 Also between 1998 and 
2006, there were a total of 124 reported cluster munitions casualties 
in Cambodia.91 
Cluster bombs are particularly more harmful than other weapons 
because of the two reasons. Firstly the cluster bomb is an „area 
weapon‟, because their contents spread over a wide area, or 
footprint.92 When multiple cluster munitions are deployed in 
tandem, the area multiplies and can cover up to 27,000 football 
fields sometimes.93 Secondly, a significant percentage of the small 
cluster bombs are duds. Due to the high failure rates of 
submunitions, many do not detonate on impact and pose a serious 
threat to civilians long after the fighting has ceased.94  Since the 
small cluster bombs often look like toys, children tend to pick them 
up, often resulting in death or amputation.95 In Albania, the overall 
                                                          
88
 William M Arkin, Ticking Time Bombs: NATO's Use of Cluster Munitions in 
Yugoslavia, Human Rights Watch (1999), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a82fc.html (last visited May 11, 2013). 
89
 Nout Van Woudenberg, The Long and Winding Road Towards an Instrument 
on Cluster Munitions, 12(3) J Conflict & Security L 447(2007). 
90
 Thomas Michael McDonnell, Cluster Bombs Over Kosovo: A Violation of 
International Law?, 44 Arizona L. Rev 31(2002). 
91
The Humanitarian Impact of Cluster Munitions, UNIDIR/2008/1, United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (Sept. 1996), available at 
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-008-D-en.pdf (last visited Jun. 
5, 2012). 
92
 Bonnie Docherty, The Time is Now: A Historical Argument for a Cluster 
Munitions Convention, 20 Harvard Human Rights J 53(2007). 
93
 Virgil Wiebe, Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as Indiscriminate Weapons 
under International Humanitarian Law, 22 Michigan J Intl L 85, (2000). 
94
 Hafiz Safikhanov, Cluster Munitions Monitoring and Information Campaign in 
Azerbaijan, 12(2) J ERW Mine Action (2008), available at 
http://maic.jmu.edu/journal/12.2/feature/bent/bent.htm (last visited Jun. 10, 2013). 
95
 Stuart Maslen, Explosive Remnants of War: Cluster Bombs and Landmines in 
Kosovo (2001), available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0780.pdf (last visited Jun. 4 
2013). 
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failure rate of North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1949 (NATO) 
submunitions was between 20–25% and between 30–35% for 
Yugoslavian (Serbian) submunitions.96 The presence of these 
unexploded submunitions impedes all aspects of post conflict 
recovery. Hence, because of these two factors i.e. wider footprints 
and high dud rates, they pose greater dangers on the civilians as 
compared to other weapons. 
Convention on Cluster Munitions 2008 
Recently during Second Lebanon War, Israel fired around 1.2 
million cluster bombs on Lebanon. Given the official failure rate of 
3%-14%, it could be well deciphered that around 21,000 failed 
bomblets are still lurking in the Lebanese soil.97 This frequent use of 
cluster munitions raised a lot of hue and cry in the international 
community. Human Rights Watch in memorandum to CCW 
delegates pointed out that not only their use but also the effects of 
cluster munitions as ERW are discriminatory.98 International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also, in its paper submitted to 
CCW delegates observed the need for a specific instrument to 
                                                          
96
 Rosy Cave, Anthea Lawson & Andrew Sherriff, Cluster Munitions in Albania 
and Lao PDR: The Humanitarian and Socio-Economic Impact, United Nations 
Institute for Disarmament Research (2006), available at 
http://www.unidir.org/pdf/ouvrages/pdf-1-92-9045-006-A-en.pdf (last visited Jun. 
2, 2013). 
97
 John Borrie and Rosy Cave, The Humanitarian Effects of Cluster Munitions: 
Why Should We Worry?, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 
(2006), available at 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/C1216801A4BBC7BFC125
722500471D38-pdf-art2528.pdf (last visited Jun. 1, 2013). 
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 Cluster Munitions and International Humanitarian Law: The Need for Better 
Compliance and Stronger Rules, Human Rights Watch, Memorandum to CCW 
Delegates(2004), available at 
http://www.mineaction.org/downloads/HRW%20paper%20on%20Cluster%20Mu
nitions%20and%20IHL.pdf (last visited May 29, 2013). 
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address the problem.99 In the meantime, two international tribunals 
have found two defendants liable for civilian deaths caused by 
cluster munitions.100 
All these efforts and events, followed by the culmination of the 
„Oslo Process‟, under whose heading five conferences were held 
between February 2007 and May 2008 resulted in the CCM 
2008. The Convention entered into effect in February 2010, six 
months after its ratification by thirty states.101 At present, there 
are108 signatories and 71 parties to CCM 2008.102 
Article 1 of the CCM 2008 bans the use, development, production, 
acquisition, stockpiling, retention, and transfer of cluster 
munitions. 
It says that each State Party undertakes never under any 
circumstance to:  
(a) Use cluster munitions, 
(b) Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or 
transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions, 
(c) Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited to a state party under this Convention. 
 Article 3 of the CCM 2008 requires state parties to destroy their 
stockpiles of cluster munitions „as soon as possible but not later 
than eight years after the entry into force of the Convention.‟ 
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 U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons, Observations on the Legal Issues Related to the Use of Cluster 
Munitions, U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE/2007/WP.8 (Jun., 2007). 
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Thomas School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-23(2007), available 
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 Convention on Cluster Munitions, U.N. Treaty Collection, available at 
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It reads as “Each State Party shall, separate all cluster munitions 
under its jurisdiction and control from munitions retained for 
operational use and mark them for the purpose of destruction”. It 
further adds that “Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure 
the destruction of all cluster munitions, as soon as possible, but not 
later than eight years after the entry into force of this Convention 
for that State Party”. Article 4 requires state parties to clear and 
destroy cluster munitions remnants under their control within ten 
years. 
Limitations of Convention on Cluster Munitions 2008 
The CCM 2008 has little power because the major producers and 
users have not joined it yet.103 Also, Article 21 of CCM 2008 which 
talks about joint military operations with the non state parties and 
allows the state parties to engage in the activities prohibited under 
the convention has also been criticized for poor drafting and 
elements of uncertainty.104 
Further Article 3(6) of CCM 2008, which provides for retention of 
cluster munitions for training purpose, also limits the operation of 
its key provisions.  
Though CCW 2003 takes care of negative after effects of cluster 
munitions, but it also has its own limitations as discussed earlier. 
Negotiations are going on about adopting a sixth protocol to CCW 
2003 which would deal with cluster munition problem.105 Till now, 
no effective conclusion has been reached. 
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 Daniel J Raccuia, The Convention on Cluster Munitions: An Incomplete 
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L 465(2011). 
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Explosive remnants of war (ERW) have a great impact on the lives 
and livelihood of millions of people around the globe. They leave 
both immediate and long term impacts on affected communities 
thereby intensifying the human suffering during and after 
humanitarian crises. But a large proportion of these effects are both 
predictable and preventable as people‟s decisions to engage with 
ordnance are likely to be driven by some form of vulnerability or 
capacity, most likely in combination.106 
The task of dealing with ERW is broad, comprehensive and 
resource intensive. However, we do have solutions in the form of 
Protocol V and CCM 2008. Despite their limitations, they represent 
a major advancement for the safety of the civilians in war torn 
communities. Countries should come forward to ratify these 
instruments and universalize them for their proper 
implementation. 
Apart from this, improved cooperation is required at every level 
and the nation states should look beyond the borders in order to 
tackle this problem. International community is more than willing 
to work out a permanent solution to the ERW problem but it is 
incumbent upon all the nations to translate this shared willingness 
into a decisive action. It is the responsibility of each individual 
party to these instruments to fulfill obligations both binding as well 
as voluntary. Strong political will is essential to deal 
comprehensively and honestly with the issue of ERW and to arrive 
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